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I. INTRODUCTION
Although most people recognize the necessity of taxes, few
people like to pay them. Governments expend costs to collect taxes;
people expend resources to avoid paying them, engaging in tax
planning activities that are, for the most part, socially wasteful. The
government knows that people will engage in such activities; a
benevolent government aiming to maximize social welfare should take
the costs of such activities into account when designing tax policy.
Tax policy thus best maximizes social welfare if it limits taxpayers'
costs incurred in developing and using methods to avoid or minimize
taxes' while also limiting lost revenue. Our article develops two
related normative corollaries of this insight.
I In the literature, some commentators distinguish between tax planning and
tax shelters. For our purposes, we assume that all costs of both activities are wasteful
social costs. In this regard, David Weisbach argues that tax planning is "almost
always positively bad for society." See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax
Shelters, 55 TAx L. REV. 215, 222 (2002). Weisbach does discuss arguments to the
contrary; those arguments carve out (without precise specification) a category of
legitimate tax planning activities. Id. at 220 n.1. We consider in Part V how the
possibility of some tax planning activity being deemed legitimate might affect our
analysis.
[Vol. 26:943
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In Part II we highlight some stylized facts and working
assumptions in order to develop a simple model. In Part III we
elaborate our first normative proposition, concerning the
government's optimal attitude towards tax planning activities. We
suggest that given the tax revenue constraint that governments face,
tax policy should be designed keeping in mind the two interrelated
costs of tax planning: the costs arising from existing tax planning
methods and the costs associated with the taxpayers' search for
additional ones. In this article we identify an interesting tradeoff
between these two costs.
Our article relates to the existing literature on optimal taxation.2
In particular, it identifies an additional variable which may be relevant
in the application of Samuelson's rule on public good provision. In its
simplest form, the Samuelson rule3 states that when deciding how
much of a public good to supply, governments should supply it up to
the point where the marginal cost of its provision equals the sum of
the marginal benefits across all affected individuals. Scholars have
since restated Samuelson's rule explicitly to include among the costs
of public good provision the deadweight loss of taxation.4 In this
article we suggest that consideration of these other indirect costs of
public good provision may lead to a more lenient attitude towards tax
planning activities.
In Part IV we elaborate upon the second normative corollary of
our article, concerning the use of governmentally-created market
failures to combat tax planning activities. The literature typically
discusses traditional legal approaches: increasing expected sanctions
by increasing the severity of penalties and/or the likelihood of
detection and enforcement. In this article we consider a different
conceptual approach. Tax planning can be discouraged by creating
failures in the market for tax planning activities. In the presence of
market failures, the incentives for tax planning may be undermined.
2 For a review of the optimal taxation literature, see Andrds Erosa & Martin
Gervais, Optimal Taxation in Infinitely-Lived Agent and Overlapping Generation
Models: A Review, 87 J. FED. RES. BANK RICH. Q. 23 (2001).
3 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 387 (1954).
4 See, e.g., Raymond G. Batina, Public Goods and Dynamic Efficiency: The
Modified Samuelson Rule, 41 J. PUB. ECON. 389 (1990); Robin Boadway & Michael
Keen, Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation, 34 INT'L ECON.
REV. 463 (1993); Mario Nava, Fred Schroyen, & Maurice Marchand, Optimal Fiscal
and Public Expenditure Policy in a Two-Class Economy, 61 J. PUB. ECON. 119 (1996);
Dan Usher, Tax Evasion and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds, 24 ECON. INQUIRY
563 (1986).
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Paradigmatically, legal intervention is aimed at correcting market
failures; here, we contemplate the possibility that market failures may
be purposely created and utilized as instruments of tax policy.5 We
consider the conventional categories of market failure - externalities,
asymmetric information, public goods, and monopoly 6 - in light of
such a possibility. We consider ways the law might create market
failures, and discuss the extent to which any such failure can be used
as an instrument to disrupt markets for tax planning.
In Part V we contextualize the analysis, looking at practical
applications of our theory of optimal governmental action. We first
present two examples in which the government decided to allow
particular tax planning methods; we consider the examples in light of
our argument that some tax planning ought to be allowed. We next
explore how the government might create failures in the market for
tax planning activities, thereby reducing such activities. We proceed
with a critical appraisal of our theoretical framework for feasibility
and desirability. In this regard, there have been various developments
and proposals along some of the lines we suggest, and we appraise the
reactions thereto.
In a companion piece, we set forth a formal economic model to
identify the optimal amount of tax planning the government should
permit, and the features and effects of our hypothetical
governmentally-created market failures.'
II. SETTING THE STAGE: OUR ASSUMPTIONS
We begin by noting the obvious: taxes are important to society,
but people do not like to pay them. 8 Governments invest resources to
collect tax revenue, and people expend resources to find ways to
reduce their tax burden. Despite government's best efforts, it is
unable to prevent people from developing and using methods to
reduce their taxes: legislators are unable to write tax laws that do not
5 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Patents, Tax Shelters, and the Firm,
26 VA. TAX REV. 981 (2007) (discussing the desirability of impeding markets in tax
planning methods).
6 See generally MICHAEL PARKIN, MICROECONOMICs, 321-82 (7th ed. 2005).
7 Philip A. Curry, Claire Hill & Francesco Parisi, Optimal Government
Responses to Tax Planning: A Mathematical Model (draft on file with authors).
8 While this assumption is commonly held and sufficiently realistic for our
purposes, in the real world people have differing attitudes towards paying tax. Some
people are more inclined to expend efforts in order to not pay tax, whereas others
may feel that it is their civic duty to pay tax. See Claire A. Hill, Tax Lawyers are
People Too, 26 VA. TAX. REV. 1065 (2007).
[Vol. 26:943946
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have "loopholes."
Let us first consider how taxpayers would search for tax planning
methods that would exploit loopholes. The greater their expected
return, the more effort they would expend. Specifically, the more
people believe they can save by finding a new tax planning method (or
earn by selling the method to others), the harder they will search.9
What can we say about people's expectations of the return to be
had? We begin by assuming that tax planning yields diminishing
marginal returns. Effort spent on looking for tax planning methods is
rewarded, but at a decreasing rate.'0 The benefit available from
9 Rent-seeking models study the economic behavior of actors outside the
traditional productive, profit-maximizing framework, and they can provide a valuable
key for the understanding of the behavior of individuals engaged in tax planning
activities. In 1967 Gordon Tullock was the first to study to what extent self-interested
parties would incur costs in the pursuit of "rents" (in our application, the rents would
be given by tax savings). See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Cost of Tariffs,
Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). Tullock's basic model was followed
by other formulations by Becker, Krueger, Posner, Demsetz, Bhagwati, Tollison, and
many others. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Directly Unproductive, Profit-
Seeking (DUP) Activities, 90 J. POL. ECON. 988 (1982); Harold Demsetz, Economics as
a Guide to Antitrust Legislation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 371 (1976); Anne 0. Krueger,
The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974);
Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.
807 (1975); Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575 (1982). Much
of the literature focuses on how much effort each player expends and how the degree
of rent dissipation varies with the value of the prize. Two quite different positions
were reached during the early years of this debate. Most scholars (Becker, Krueger,
Posner, Demsetz, and others) suggested that rent-seeking competition would generate
equilibria similar to those generated by competitive markets, with a full dissipation of
the available rents. Posner's full dissipation hypothesis became popular in the
empirical literature and also had a strong appeal in the theoretical literature. In the
subsequent years the literature analogized rents to profits, maintaining that both were
likely to be competed away in the long-run equilibrium. According to this hypothesis,
in a long-run equilibrium, expenditures in tax planning would thus yield the normal
market rate of return. Gordon Tullock shook this conventional wisdom in the
literature, showing that the full dissipation result would hold only under very narrow
conditions. Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent-Seeking, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN,
ROBERT TOLLISON & GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOCIETY, 97-112 (1980). According to Tullock, in most situations, some residual rent
could be captured by the players and the rent would not be fully dissipated.
According to this alternative hypothesis, in a long-run equilibrium, expenditures in
tax planning could thus yield above-normal rates of return.
10 As we discuss in the text, however, at a certain point the "rewards" may be
negative, as the taxpayer's tax liability, use of tax planning techniques, or both
become more likely to attract the government's attention.
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identifying a second tax planning method will generally be lower than
the benefit from the first one. Thus, the amount of money that people
can save increases in the number of available tax planning methods,
but at a decreasing rate. The loopholes the methods exploit can
overlap, such that there is some redundancy in the second loophole.
Later searches thus may yield methods that would shelter income or
gains already partially or wholly sheltered. Taxpayers may be able to
carry forward tax losses that exceed a particular year's taxable
income; however, all else being equal, the less tax they pay, the more
likely they are to be scrutinized by the government, potentially
resulting in the disallowance of some of those losses. Beyond a
certain point, then, the use of any additional tax planning methods
may expose the taxpayer to increased chances of detection. It
therefore follows that the more tax planning methods currently are
allowed, the less effort taxpayers will exert looking for new ones.
Given that taxpayers will behave in this manner, how should the
government proceed in designing tax policy? First, we note that tax
planning efforts are for the most part unproductive, socially wasteful
activities. When people engage in tax planning to reduce their tax
burdens, they are not creating new wealth for society. They are
simply putting (or keeping) money in their own pockets that would
have gone to somebody else (specifically, the government). In
economic terms, tax planning is a form of rent seeking behavior.
Thus, a benevolent government should attempt to design government
policy to take into account both the revenue raised and the wasteful
efforts that people will expend to avoid taxes. Hereinafter, we shall
refer to taxpayers' search and tax avoidance costs as "dissipation
costs" and to the social deadweight loss from government's losses in
tax revenue as "tax revenue losses."
Second, we assume that the government is trying to minimize the
sum of dissipation costs and tax revenue losses. We also assume that
governments design tax policy with imperfect foresight but with
rational expectations. Even though, in any given year, there may be
newly-discovered techniques that the government did not anticipate
(imperfect foresight), the government fully anticipates that some tax
planning techniques will be devised and that some tax revenue will
unavoidably be lost through the use of those techniques (rational
expectations). The government anticipates losing some revenue to tax
planning - it just does not know the exact method by which the
revenue loss will occur. The amount the government anticipates
losing on account of tax planning activities is included in the
government's policy plan. In the short term, the government cannot
[Vol. 26:943948
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simply change its tax regime to make up the revenue it loses to tax
planning activities. Thus, the government's own cost-benefit
calculations limit the amount of revenue it can feasibly raise under
any current tax regime.
Finally, we assume that the marginal social cost of a dollar of lost
tax revenue is increasing. That is, we assume that the social costs of
lost revenue are increasing at an increasing rate. Under these
assumptions, it is not cost-effective for the government to seek to
eliminate tax planning activities entirely. At a certain point, the cost
of the additional search effort that taxpayers will exert outweighs the
additional revenues the government might obtain. It is therefore
optimal for the government to allow some amount of tax planning.
III. TAX POLICY AND OPTIMAL GOVERNMENTAL ACTION:
ENDOGENIZING "ILLEGITIMATE" TAX PLANNING
The above description of a basic model allows us to consider the
following scenario. The government enacts a tax policy. Somebody
immediately develops a tax planning method to reduce her tax
burden. The government has to decide what to do with respect to the
tax planning method. Should it close the loophole the method
exploits, declaring the method illegitimate, or should it allow use of
the method in the future?"
Our model of governmental action allows us to endogenize the
distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" tax planning
activities. Although all tax planning activities are undesirable for the
government, the government chooses to target only some of them as
illegitimate. Notwithstanding our assumption that social welfare
positively depends on the government's success in collecting tax
revenue, our analysis leads to the (presumably controversial)
conclusion that, all else being equal, social welfare may be increased if
the government allows some forms of tax planning. People will look
for additional loopholes regardless of whether the existing loopholes
are closed, but, all else equal, will look harder the smaller the possible
tax savings are from existing loopholes. Thus, the amount of wasteful
search efforts is directly affected by the government's decision.
Of course, in the real world, the government has far more than these two
stylized options. Other than expressly or by implicit acquiescence allowing the
method, the government might simply use resources it knows to be insufficient to
curtail the method's use. And of course, the government needs to know about the
strategy to decide to do anything specifically targeted against it.
2007]
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A benevolent government therefore faces a difficult tradeoff. By
declaring a given tax strategy "illegitimate," the government boosts its
tax revenue, but induces taxpayers to expend resources in the search
for additional tax strategies. The government should also seek to
reduce taxpayers' search, not only because it is through search that
taxpayers find ways to minimize their taxes, but also because the
ensuing dissipation costs represent social welfare losses. Our analysis
suggests that, even assuming that the government could identify and
close all loopholes, it should not do so. A benevolent government
optimally should use soft intervention, restricting the scope of existing
loopholes to varying degrees, without closing them entirely,
anticipating and minimizing the dissipation that is likely to ensue from
the arms-race between taxpayers and tax authorities.
Further, since the government seeks to maximize the total
revenue it collects net of collection and dissipation costs, it wants to
reduce both taxpayers' use of tax planning methods and their sale of
such methods to others, who will also use the methods to minimize
their taxes. The appropriate tax policy should consider that the
taxpayers' interest in searching for new tax planning methods is not
only driven by their desire to minimize their tax burden: under some
circumstances, taxpayers' search may also be motivated by their
interest to gain from the sale of tax planning methods to other
taxpayers.12
IV. MARKET FAILURES AS TAX POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Dissipation deadweight losses increase in the amount of effort
that taxpayers expend to reduce their tax burden (search). Search
efforts increase in the expected private benefits that accrue to the
finder of a new tax planning strategy and in the potential profits that
could be made from selling the tax strategy to other taxpayers. Lost
revenue costs are increasing in the number of new tax planning
strategies that are identified (discovery) and in the number of people
that use them (dissemination). In this part, we introduce basic
concepts from price theory to consider the possible use of
governmental intervention in reducing the search, discovery, and
dissemination of tax planning strategies.
The fundamental idea is as follows: since the incentives for search,
supply, and demand in the market can be negatively affected by
12 David Weisbach makes closely related arguments. See David A. Weisbach,
An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88,
96-109 (2002); Weisbach, supra note 1, at 231-42.
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market failures, the legal system can reduce the search, supply, and
demand for tax planning strategies though the creation of
governmentally-created market failures. In the presence of market
failures, the market forces that normally allocate resources and create
production incentives in our economy are defective or absent.
Economists have identified four general categories of market failure,
including monopoly, public goods, asymmetric information, and
externalities. In such cases, markets may "fail" in the sense that they
cannot ensure that the good is produced and consumed in the
amounts in which it would have been produced and consumed had the
market not failed.
While governments are generally involved in making markets run
more smoothly, in this case the government prefers the market to be
less efficient. How can the government introduce market frictions?
A. Creating Monopolies: Patenting Tax Planning Strategies
Monopoly is a standard case of market failure. A monopoly
exists when there is only one supplier of a good in an industry and the
good has no close substitutes. Patents and copyrights" are common
examples of legally-created monopolies. Patents and copyrights give
exclusive intellectual property rights to the discoverer or creator,
preventing other individuals from competing with the patent or
copyright holder in the exploitation of their intellectual property
rights. According to economic theory, monopolists are price-makers,
not price-takers. A monopolist can set prices above marginal cost,
which places a wedge between the consumer's willingness to pay for
the good and the producer's cost.
An increase in price implies that fewer goods will be sold. In the
general case, this is undesirable because it results in lost social surplus
(deadweight loss). Because monopoly firms reduce output below the
socially efficient, competitive level, legislatures often pass laws to
prohibit or regulate them. In the special case under consideration, if
tax planning strategies can be patented, thereby granting exclusive
rights to the discoverer, the resulting reduction in the quantity of
13 On patents and copyrights generally, see ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F.
COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES (2005); see also WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969)
(addressing patent law); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (addressing copyright law).
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14
available tax planning strategies may instead be desirable. A social
benefit, rather than a social loss, would result from monopoly
underproduction. It follows that, unlike in the typical case, a
monopoly over tax planning strategies should be promoted and
protected, rather than prohibited and regulated.
The idea that the creation of a monopoly can be used as a policy
instrument in the context of markets for tax strategies should be
qualified at this point. Even though patents may result in an ex post
restriction of supply, they may exacerbate ex ante search incentives."
If a person (or entity) obtains a patent on a tax planning method that
he created, he can license the patent to others. His ability to earn fees
from such a license should increase his incentive to search in the first
instance; dissipation costs should therefore increase. The effect of
introducing tax patents on tax revenue losses will depend on the
relative magnitude of the two effects.
Price theory allows us to provide an additional qualitative
assessment of the two effects under consideration. For example, if a
monopolist can charge different prices to different consumers (price
discrimination), then his total output will approach that of a perfectly
competitive market. In this scenario, the property protection effect
(i.e., the increase in search and discovery) will dominate the monopoly
effect (i.e., the monopolist's restriction of output). In other words, if
tax patents are available and tax patent holders or licensees can
perfectly discriminate, the outcome for the government is the worst
one possible. The market supply is efficient: the tax planning method
becomes fully disseminated throughout the population, which
maximizes lost revenue. Further, monopoly profits are maximized,
meaning that the incentive to search for new tax planning strategies is
at its peak, and dissipation costs will also be maximized.
The case in which a tax patent holder cannot price discriminate is
somewhat more promising. In this case, the knowledge of the tax
planning strategy will not fully disseminate, so lost revenue costs will
14 See e.g., Burk & McDonnell, supra note 5, at 986.
15 One commenter noted, "[t]he fundamental purpose of providing patents, as I
understand it, is to promote innovation. While no one can dispute this as a generally
desirable goal, it would be hard to identify a subject less in need of further innovation
than tax planning." Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures
of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 109-77 (2006) (statement of
Ellen Aprill, Associate Dean of Academic Programs, Professor of Law, John E.
Anderson Chair in Tax Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California). Whether
or not patents generally promote innovation is open to question. See generally BLAIR
& COTrER, supra note 13, at 17.
[Vol. 26:943
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not be as high. 6 Similarly, the value of having the patent will be lower
because a non-discriminating monopolist is unable to capture the
entire consumer surplus. Dissipation costs will therefore be lower
than they would have been in the case where the monopolist could
price discriminate.
Will tax patent holders be able to price discriminate? People who
develop tax planning methods may very well be able to compute how
much a buyer would pay. The patent effectively prevents the buyer
from reselling and it is in both the developer (patent holder) and the
buyer's interest to not have information about the transactions
become too widely known. While the extent to which tax patent
holders will be able to price discriminate is an empirical question,
theory suggests that considerable price discrimination may be
possible.
Which is better: to allow patenting of tax planning methods or not
to do so? The answer depends on what would happen if patents are
not allowed. Consider an environment in which there are many
taxpayers, each of whom is able to search for new tax planning
methods. Let us assume for simplicity that there are no property
rights, whether through patents or by other means. Comparing this
case to the one where there are patents but patent holders cannot
perfectly price discriminate, we see that the patent case provides
greater incentive to search (patent holders earn profits as well as
reducing their own taxes), but the effect on lost revenue is ambiguous.
Without property rights, the people who reduce their taxes are the
ones who discover a tax planning method. With a patent, the people
who reduce their taxes are those who are willing to pay the
monopolist's price. We cannot say which effect is greater. So, if
dissipation costs are not high and the monopolist is particularly
inefficient, such that there is a large deadweight loss, then the
government might do better if patents are allowed than if people
cannot have property rights over their tax planning methods.
If the government could anticipate particular tax planning
methods, it could use the ability to patent such methods to its
advantage: it could simply patent the methods - easily regulating the
extent to which the tax planning method is used (perhaps not at all) -
by deciding who may use it, of course in exchange for a fee. Note that
16 Of course, the assumption that people will keep their ideas to themselves in
the absence of patents is not necessarily realistic. The law provides protection short
of patents, in the form of trade secrecy laws. See Burk & McDonnell, supra note 5, at
987. Furthermore, markets have a habit of springing up, even in the absence of strong
property rights.
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the fee would defray the tax revenue losses of use of the method with
the income earned from selling the right to use the technique. Of
course, if the government could anticipate such methods, it should
have considerable success simply prohibiting them ex ante. In any
event, the government traditionally has not been successful in
anticipating such methods. a7 The government might also be able to
buy such a patent from the innovator who obtained the patent,
thereby also regulating the extent to which the method is used.
However, doing so would likely be more expensive than trying to
curtail the method using more traditional sanctions.
The possibility of patenting tax planning methods suggests an
interesting strategy. Somebody - the government, someone
effectively subsidized by the government, or a group that was opposed
to tax planning activity - might be able to patent one component of
many strategies and either refuse to license it or license it only at very
high fees. 18 In either case, those seeking to develop and market tax
planning methods would find doing so more difficult and less lucrative
than it otherwise would have been, given the need to either pay for
use of the component or of finding ways to structure around it. 9 This
would reduce both search and discovery and dissemination.
Another aspect of tax patents needs to be considered. Some tax
planning methods will attract more government efforts to shut them
down than others. Which ones do so may depend on fairly predictable
factors, such as the amount of revenue lost, publicity arising about a
particular transaction that yielded political pressure to take action, or
serendipity. How might the possibility that a method may have a
short shelf life affect the analysis? Patenting may, on the one hand,
shorten the shelf life further, as the information disclosed in the
17 There are many reasons why this might be the case. One strong possibility is
that the task requires resources beyond what the government has concluded it would
be worthwhile to expend and the government has instead decided on a strategy of ex
post enforcement against specific, already-developed methods and its arsenal of more
general prohibitions.
is A non-governmental entity that received such fees could use them to fund its
other activities or contribute them to a worthy cause. We thank David Weisbach for
suggesting this possibility, as well as suggesting the idea that the entity itself, rather
than the government or government-subsidized entity, might suitably carry out the
strategy.
19 In this regard, Burk and McDonnell discuss the possibility that an
"anticommons" problem could arise if intellectual property rights needed for tax
planning methods were too widely held; it might be impossible to negotiate with all
the rights-holders necessary to develop and market the method. See Burk &
McDonnell, supra note 5, at 996-99.
[Vol. 26:943
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patent application gives the government information to disallow the
method; however, patenting may also allow the method to yield more
revenue as it is sold aggressively.
B. Public Goods: Creating or Exacerbating Free Rider Problems
Another type of market failure involves public goods. When
goods are available free of charge, the market forces that normally
allocate resources and create production incentives in the economy
are absent. In the case of public goods, markets "fail" because they
will not supply a sufficient amount of goods. The public goods
problem is the effect of the so-called free rider problem. A free rider
is a person who receives the benefit of a good but avoids paying for it.
When goods are available free of charge and people cannot be
excluded from enjoying the benefits of a good to which they have not
contributed, individuals may adopt free riding strategies and withhold
paying for the good hoping that others will pay for it.E° Because there
is no easy way to induce parties to reveal their valuation of the public
good through the price system, markets do not supply sufficiently
large amounts of public goods.
One of the market problems commonly associated with the search
for new ideas is the free rider problem. New products and ideas are
typically expensive to create, but easy to replicate. The legal system
generally wants to establish incentives to increase the supply of public
goods. Here, we are faced with the opposite concern and policy
objective: the government would like to decrease the incentive to
develop new tax planning methods.
The incentive to develop tax planning techniques depends on the
aggregate benefit available to the developer. An important
component of that benefit may be the ability to sell the technique to
others. Others will not be willing to pay for it if they can get it for
free; if they can get it cheaply they will not be willing to pay much.
The less they have to pay, all else being equal, the smaller the benefit
there is to searching for and developing the techniques. The legal
system may develop ways to condition the use of a tax planning
technique on disclosure. For instance, the government could force
public disclosure of any tax planning method somebody used; others
would therefore be able to use it for free. The result would be
increased dissemination of the method, leading to greater lost revenue
as more people use the method. But the incentive to search for and
2G See PARKIN, supra note 6.
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develop the methods in the first instance would be far smaller. People
could not get a return from selling the method; moreover, they would
know that they might be able to use somebody else's method for free.
If markets are efficient, the increased lost revenue would be small
(perhaps even zero), but the reduction in dissipation costs could be
very high.
C. Asymmetric Information
Another form of market failure reflects the fact that information
is asymmetric: different people have access to different information.
There are two main effects of asymmetric information: adverse
selection and moral hazard problems. These effects are generally seen
as socially undesirable, inasmuch as they negatively affect the
allocative efficiency role, and possibly the existence, of markets.
Transactions may be difficult to effectuate because each party believes
the other may be hiding self-serving negative information. In the
context of tax planning markets, these concerns turn into a hope,
inasmuch as both of these effects can help disrupt the market for tax
planning.
1. Adverse Selection: The Market for Tax Lemons
Adverse selection involves somebody who knows he has
undesirable attributes dealing with others who may not be able to
readily determine whether he has those attributes. The classic
example is the used car: many buyers are reluctant to buy a used car
because they suspect that, if the car is being sold, the seller must know
something bad about it. This is also known as the lemons problem.21
The basic story for the market for lemons is as follows. Suppose there
are three quality levels for used cars: high, medium, and low. Car
owners know what type of car they have, but they cannot credibly
convey this information to buyers - all owner/sellers will want to say
their car is high quality. Buyers are willing to pay an amount that
reflects what they expect the car's quality to be. If the pool of
available cars includes medium and low quality cars, buyers may only
be willing to pay less than the amount that high quality car owners will
accept. Thus, high quality cars will not be sold; all cars sold will be of
medium or lower quality. Buyers, being rational, lower their
expectations of the quality of cars available. Again, however, buyers
"1 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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are not able to tell which are of medium quality and which are of low
quality; they base their willingness to pay on the expected quality. As
before, this willingness to pay might be less than the amount that
medium quality car owners need in order to be willing to sell. Thus
the used car market would be comprised of only low quality cars, or
lemons.
What would a lemons story look like in the context of tax
planning? Tax planning methods, like cars, can be of differing quality.
If buyers of tax planning methods cannot tell which type of method
they are buying, the methods that are available for sale might all be
lemons. Since buyers could not be sure that they were purchasing a
high quality method, they would only offer a lemons price - a price
the seller of the high quality method would be unwilling to accept.
The high quality methods would therefore not be sold. Tax revenue
would be higher since those methods would not be being used to
reduce revenues. Incentives to search for tax planning methods would
decline as well, since the rewards to search would be lower.
An essential component to the market for lemons is the
uncertainty that the buyer faces at the time of purchase as to the
quality of what she is purchasing. In the context of tax planning
methods, the requisite uncertainty exists. Some tax planning methods
are comparatively easy to appraise. However, even long-standing
methods whose workings are well-known may face the risk of being
declared illegitimate. Moreover, as methods are shut down, new ones
are developed. Finally, the tax code changes frequently, giving rise to
the development of new methods that exploit those changes.
Frequent changes to the tax code, bemoaned as they are, thus might
help to create socially desirable market failures.22 Of course, the
incentive to search decreases in the length of time that a tax policy has
been in place, because the number of tax planning methods left to find
decreases. Thus the optimal rate of change would be set by the
tradeoff between these two considerations.
Exacerbating this standard adverse selection mechanism is an
interesting feature of tax planning methods. The government is more
likely to detect use of a tax planning method if more people are using
it, more money is being saved on account of its use, or some
combination of the two. For each sale, the probability that the
method cannot be sold again will increase, as will the probability that
the buyer cannot use the method. Thus, sellers will want to be paid
22 A full analysis will also take into consideration the social costs of complying
with new rules by taxpayers whose aim is actually to comply.
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more, and buyers will want to pay less, than would be the case if the
expected returns to use of the method stayed constant. Indeed, the
better the method, the more divergent its valuation by the seller and
buyer may become. A market for lemons dynamic thus should
already exist; the government can strengthen it by announcing
increased efforts to find the more popular or more effective methods.
2. Moral Hazard and the Principal-Agent Problem
Moral hazard13 arises when a person whose behavior cannot be
monitored has the ability and incentive to engage in behavior that is
not in the interest of the individual or firm that will be affected by his
or her actions. The moral hazard problem again entails asymmetric
information. The basic story is as follows. Two parties enter into a
contract. The value of the contract depends on the amount of effort
that one of the parties expends. However, the other agent cannot
observe how much effort is put forth. For example, an employer may
not be able to tell exactly how hard an employee is working, or an
insurance company may not be able to tell whether and how hard a
customer is actually trying to avoid accidents. If it were possible to
see how much effort is being exerted, one would simply reward that
effort. Since it is not possible, the person will not expend as much
effort as she otherwise would.
This form of market failure suggests other possible disruptions of
the market for tax planning methods. There may be ways to limit a
seller's or lessor's ability to assure the buyer or lessee of the method
that the method is of high quality. The lemons problem discussed
above could thus be exacerbated. But, going further, it may be
possible to limit incentives for search for planning methods to be sold
by limiting individuals' ability to be compensated for their efforts. In
many firms engaged in developing tax planning methods, pay is
gauged at least in significant part by performance. If tax rules provide
sanctions to individuals developing such methods, the individuals will
want to minimize the extent to which a method is associated with
them personally; this should make infeasible a contract which
rewarded the employee for his performance in developing the
method, thus creating a moral hazard problem. It also should limit
the efforts he spends in developing them.
23 See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974).
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D. Other Governmentally-Created Market Distortions
There are several other scenarios in which smooth functioning of
the market is disrupted. In the following part we will briefly mention
some of these scenarios. Once again, the situations that will be
discussed are generally seen as socially undesirable insofar as they
disrupt market functioning; however, in the context of markets for tax
planning methods, disruption is the aim.
1. Hold-Ups: Fostering Strategic Behavior
The hold-up problem concerns the possibility of opportunistic
behavior in a transaction stemming from the transaction's timing. 4
Suppose that one person has to complete her side of the bargain
before the other. Once the person does so, she is essentially at the
mercy of the other, since there is nothing (other than the court action
or reputational concerns) forcing the second person to complete her
performance.
How might the hold-up problem apply to the market for tax
planning methods? Consider our first story about the comparison of a
market with patents to a market with no property rights. We assumed
that people would not sell their ideas when there were no property
rights; we later noted that the assumption might not be realistic. One
way that people would try to create property rights in the absence of
patents is through contracts. The buyer would agree that if he resells
the idea, he would be subject to large penalties. If the government
made such contracts unenforceable, a hold-up problem would exist.
After the sale of a method, nothing would prevent the buyer from
giving the information to friends or reselling the idea at a lower cost.
People might therefore not sell their tax planning methods, especially
if the probability of a method being shut down were to increase in the
number of users.
2. Risk Misallocations: Allocating Risk to an Inferior Risk Bearer
The higher expected sanctions are, and the less those sanctions
can be allocated to lower-cost bearers (people who can best diversify
the risk that those sanctions impose), the higher the benefits must be
to motivate additional searches for tax planning techniques. Thus, the
search is likely to stop sooner if higher-cost risk bearers must bear the
risk than if the risk could be allocated to lower-cost risk bearers.
24 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 62-63 (4th ed. 1992).
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Higher expected sanctions (the sanction times the probability the
sanction will be imposed) are a well-worn weapon in the traditional
arsenal; the gloss here is to ensure that the sanction is imposed on
somebody particularly ill-suited to bear it. S 25
Contracts typically allocate risk to the cheapest cost avoider. A
party who, for instance, can more cheaply acquire insurance on
property might assume the risk that the property will be damaged.
The same is not infrequently true for risks the parties do not think to
allocate: courts sometimes implicitly or even expressly use the
principle of allocating risk to the cheapest cost avoider or best situated
risk bearer when deciding ex post who should bear a particular risk. 6
The lower the aggregate costs of transacting, the larger the pie the
parties will have to divide; thus, allocation of costs to the cheapest cost
avoider (and the allocation of risks to the best situated risk bearer)
should encourage contracting.
How could the government create risk and then place it on the
most risk averse party? How might it be able to prevent allocation of
known risks to the cheapest cost avoider? It is generally believed that
people are more risk averse than firms. The government would
therefore prefer to place risk on individuals rather than firms. What
kinds of risk could there be? As we discussed above, for many tax
planning methods, there is risk about whether the method will deliver
the promised benefits, and if so, how many times it can be used.
Suppose that to use a tax method, a person has to identify an
individual as the developer of that method and include the
individual's certification that the method works. Suppose further that
the government prohibits as against public policy indemnities or
reimbursement of the individual by his employer for any liabilities
incurred to anyone on account of the tax planning method. The
individual could be sued by the buyer of the tax planning method or,
for that matter, by the government. The effect of targeting the
individual rather than the firm should be that fewer sales would take
place, reducing both lost revenue costs and search costs.
" See Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business
Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 43-51 (2001).
26 See POSNER, supra note 24, at 89-137.
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V. CONTEXTUALIZING THE ANALYSIS: GOVERNMENTAL
INTERVENTION AND MARKET DISRUPTIONS IN PRACTICE
A. Allowing an Optimal Amount of Tax Planning
We argued above that it may be optimal for the government to
allow some amount of tax planning. We noted that there are different
ways for the government to proceed; one way is to simply legitimize a
tax planning method. Two examples in which the government has
done so follow:
1. Check-the-Box Regulations
One example is the "check-the-box" regulations for business
entity designation. Corporations are subject to entity-level taxation
- that is, there is tax when the corporation receives income and again
when its shareholders receive that income in the form of dividends.
Partnerships are pass-through entities: if the partnership earns
income, the partnership itself is not taxed. Rather, the tax arises when
each partner pays some share of the tax attributable to that income.
At different times in history, the Internal Revenue Service (Service)
had differing concerns as to which entity it sought to discourage; at a
certain point, the Service disfavored the partnership entity, on
grounds that partnerships were being used "as tax shelters." The
Service originally sought to impose two tests: (1) a formal test
pursuant to which an entity seeking to qualify as a partnership had to
lack at least two out of four "corporate characteristics" and (2) a more
discretionary test focusing on substance.27 In 1976, a Tax Court
decision gave some comfort to tax planners who met the formal test
but perhaps ran afoul of the more discretionary test;28 in 1979, the
Service agreed to follow that decision. Lawyers got better and better
at meeting the formal test, to the point where partnership treatment
eventually became nearly elective.29 Eventually, the Service adopted
"check-the-box" regulations which effectively acknowledged that
partnership treatment had become elective: an entity desiring such
treatment could simply "check-the-box.,
30
27 See Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U.L.
REV. 185, 212-18 (2004).
28 Id. at n.202.
29 Id. at 229.
30 See generally Polsky, supra note 27. It could be argued, though, that in this
example, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) was simply acknowledging the
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2. Tracing
A corporation can deduct the interest it pays when it borrows
money, but it is typically taxed when it earns income, including
interest, on its investments. However, some investments generate tax-
free income. The concern is that a corporation will use tax-deductible
borrowing to earn tax-free income. A variety of statutes and
regulations in fact prohibit this and related practices. But the
regulatory scheme serves largely as a trap for the unwary. There are
mechanical rules to be used to connect a loan with its proceeds so that
the proceeds can be "traced" to the borrowing. But these rules can
easily be circumvented. A leading casebook notes that: "the tracing
approach of the regulations contains tax savings opportunities for
those who plan their transactions carefully and tax increases or, more
likely, random tax consequences for the unknown or unwary and
people with better ways to spend their time."'"
3. Discussion
The foregoing are examples in which the government has decided
to let people structure their affairs so that they pay less tax than they
otherwise might. Our account provides an argument about why and
when it might behave in this manner - that is, when the returns to
search are high because there are many additional tax planning
methods to be found and the revenue cost of the ones being employed
is within an acceptable range. An interesting area to consider in this
regard involves multinational corporations arranging their
transactions and, indeed, engaging in transactions to minimize their
32
overall tax burden. Here, too, the existence of the techniques is well
known. The techniques are allowed to continue and, arguably,
flourish given the increasing mobility of assets and operations.
inevitable - that its costs in attempting to enforce its prohibition exceeded any
revenues it was likely to obtain.
31 MICHAEL GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 348 (5th ed. 2005).
32 Indeed, one of us, Hill, met someone casually on a plane who told her at some
length, in a voice speaking at a normal volume, about his company's activities of this
type, which he spearheaded; he also told Hill where he worked, demonstrating that he
did not think he had much to fear.
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B. Viewing Recent Regulatory Initiatives as Attempts at Disruption:
Amendments to Circular 230, the Thompson (now McNulty) Memo,
and Sarbanes Oxley
1. Amendments to Circular 23033
Tax planning methods used to effectively come with "insurance."
If a law firm could give an opinion that the method passed muster
(usually, that the tax position taken was "more likely than not" to
prevail 34) the client using the method could avoid penalties; in effect,
the worst thing that could happen is that the client would have to pay
the taxes he was trying to avoid, with interest. As amended, Circular
230 provides that clients can avoid the imposition of penalties only if
the opinion they receive considers and discusses a great many items in
detail. Many matters lawyers had previously dealt with by making
assumptions now have to be thoroughly investigated. The lawyers
may risk liability themselves if the firm gives an unsupported opinion;
they may face monetary penalties and the loss of their ability to
practice before the Service.3" The firm and its lawyers also may face
greater reputational costs. Moreover, for transactions identified by
the Service as highly suspect, transactions in which the client agrees to
maintain the confidentiality of the tax advice, or transactions in which
the practitioner's pay is contingent on the promised tax savings, any
opinion must be of this elaborate form, even if the client is willing to
forego any protection against penalties. Some tax practitioners have
advised their clients that issuing opinions that protect the clients fromS 36
penalties will now be much more expensive; indeed, such an effect is
surely among those that the Service desired, and perhaps even
expressly intended. It is not yet resolved whether the lawyer's analysis
in providing the opinion - the very detailed analysis Circular 230 as
amended now requires in many instances - is available to the
government. If it is, the government will be able to get free of charge
13 31 C.F.R. pt. 10. (2005). The 2005 amendments to Circular 230 are the ones of
note for our purposes; the original Circular 230 was not specifically designed to
address tax planning activities.
'4 See generally LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX
CONTROVERSIES: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 15-24 (2002).
" David Schizer notes, however, that "the [Service] has not sought to impose
this sanction yet, even in egregious cases, leaving the bar to wonder whether they can
safely ignore this possibility." David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, TAX L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 47, on file with author).
16 See, e.g., Claybrook & Assoc., IRS Circular 230 Compliance, http://www.
msclaybrook.comcirc230comp.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
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information that it presumably will find quite valuable in formulating
its arguments against the tax planning method at issue and rebutting
contrary arguments, as well as detecting other methods that presently
exist or are in the process of being developed.37
It should be noted at this juncture that while the amendments to
the Circular were principally aimed at tax shelters, not tax planning,
the amended Circular's reach is quite broad - something that is not
surprising given the lack of consensus as to what constitutes a shelter.
We have thus far largely assumed away the distinction between tax
shelters and tax planning; we turn shortly to a consideration of this
issue.
2. The Thompson/McNulty Memo
38The Thompson Memo, released in 2003, set forth Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. The Memo became
quite controversial. 39 Among its most controversial provisions were
those indicating that in charging a corporation, prosecutors should
take into account whether the corporation had been cooperative,
where cooperativeness was determined in part by the corporation's
(a) waiving attorney-client privilege and work product protection and
(b) refusing to pay its employees' legal bills.40 The Thompson Memo
37 Considerable commentary exists on Circular 230, including law firm memos
posted on the internet. See, e.g., Terrence G. Perris, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey,
LLP, Beyond the Legend: The Impact of New Circular 230 (Oct. 12, 2005),
http://library.findlaw.com/2005/Oct/12/204044.html.
38 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen. on Principles
of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Org. (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/cftf/corporate_.guidelines.htm (hereinafter Thompson Memo). There is also an
intervening memo, the "McCallum Memo." See Memorandum from Robert D.
McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney Gen. on Waiver of Corp. Attorney-Client &
Work Product Protection (Oct. 21, 2005), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.
comlwhitecollarcrimeblog/files/AttorneyClientWaiverMemo.pdf.
'9 See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Thompson Memo Out, McNulty Memo In (Dec. 12,
2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/12/thompson-memo-out-mcnulty-memo-in
(providing a discussion of the Thompson Memo on the Wall Street Journal law and
business blog).
,0 The Memo states:
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a
corporation's cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, if
necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections,
both with respect to its internal investigation and with respect to
communication between specific officers, directors and employees and
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was in force as KPMG was pursued by the government for its tax
• 41
shelter activities. In the KPMG trial, Judge Kaplan ruled that the
Memo's prohibitions on paying employees' legal bills violated their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and their Fifth Amendment
substantive due process right to "to obtain and use in order to prepare
a defense with resources lawfully available to [the defendants], free of
knowing and reckless government interference.,
42
Not surprisingly, in the McNulty Memo,43 which superseded the
Thompson Memo, the government retrenched. In pertinent part, the
Memo states, as to the waiver of attorney-client privilege and work
product protections:
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest and most
sacrosanct privileges under U.S. law.... The work product
doctrine also serves similarly important interests.
Waiver of attorney-client and work product protections is not
a prerequisite to a finding that a company has cooperated in
the government's investigation. However, a company's
disclosure of privileged information may permit the
government to expedite its investigation. In addition, the
disclosure of privileged information may be critical in
enabling the government to evaluate the accuracy and
completeness of the company's voluntary disclosure.
Prosecutors may only request waiver of attorney-client or
work product protections when there is a legitimate need for
the privileged information to fulfill their law enforcement
counsel.... Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the
corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.
Thus... a corporation's promise of support to culpable employees and
agents, either thought the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining
the employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing
information to the employees about the government investigation pursuant
to a joint defense agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor in
weighing the extent and value of a corporation's cooperation.
Thompson Memo, supra note 38, at § VI.
41 United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
42 See generally Irvin B. Nathan & Michael S. Lewis, The Thompson Memo
Ruling: Recent Decision May Have Little Effect on Other Cases, 14 ALM Bus. CRIMES
BULL. No. 2, Oct. 2006, available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/pubs/files/Irv-
NathanandMichaelLewis.pdf.
43 Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen. on Principles of
Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Org. (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
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obligations. A legitimate need for the information is not
established by concluding it is merely desirable or convenient
to obtain privileged information. The test requires a careful
balancing of important policy considerations underlying the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and the
law enforcement needs of the government's investigation.
4
On the payment of expenses for officers and employees, the Memo
states:
Prosecutors generally should not take into account whether a
corporation is advancing attorneys' fees to employees or
agents under investigation and indictment. Many state
indemnification statutes grant corporations the power to
advance the legal fees of officers under investigation prior to
a formal determination of guilt. As a consequence, many
corporations enter into contractual obligations to advance
attorneys' fees through provisions contained in their
corporate charters, bylaws or employment agreements.
Therefore, a corporation's compliance with governing state
law and its contractual obligations cannot be considered a
failure to cooperate. 5
3. Sections 302 and 906 of Sarbanes Oxley
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to Enron,
WorldCom, and other big corporate scandals, requires that a
company's top officers provide personal certifications as to the
46company's filings. Such certifications might conceivably encompass
tax planning activity. An argument could be made that an officer
providing such a certification might in effect be certifying that she has,
after some investigation, no knowledge that the company is engaging
in aggressive tax planning activities that could be disallowed and as to
which significant penalties could be imposed. A knowingly false
certification could be grounds for personal liability, including the
imposition of criminal penalties.
Id. at 8-9.
45 Id. at 11.
46 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, §§ 302,
906 (2002).
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4. Discussion
The foregoing suggests that the government, too, is thinking along
the lines of focusing on individuals: it is going after individuals' ability
to defend themselves or be insulated by their corporations and, in the
case of tax professionals, their ability to practice before the Service.47
Individuals are not well able to diversify against risks of this type. In
requiring the types of legal opinions that it does under Circular 230,
the government is also perhaps creating a means by which it can
appropriate costly research done by people who are almost certainly
highly motivated and highly intelligent to assist it in its efforts.
Effectively, it is free riding off the efforts of others.
Also, as individuals face more risk being associated with tax
planning activity, they may be less inclined to invest in building up
reputations for their skills in the area, reputations which might
improve their prospects. They thus should be deterred from such
activities. The inability to profitably acquire and exploit such
reputations, as well as their employers' difficulty in compensating
them for their "performance" if that performance could lead to
sanctions, should together provide individuals with an incentive to
pursue other, possibly more lucrative, areas. It is not likely that firms
• 48
will want to cultivate such reputations either. The weaker the
seller's reputation, the more of a lemons discount the buyer of tax
planning methods will demand.
C. Discussion and Summary
In the preceding subsection, we considered how to make
individuals, who are presumably less able to bear risk do so. We
briefly discussed the possibility that firms might in effect be required
to provide information on their methods for free.
Of course, a great deal more could be done along both these lines:
individuals could be made to certify techniques, firms could be made
to disclose their use in "plain language" in their public filings as a
condition to being able to use them, contracts for tax planning could
be denied enforcement on public policy grounds, and so on.
But these proposals are ultimately largely infeasible. One of the
main difficulties faced by the government is one we assume away.
47 Schizer, supra note 35, makes some complementary arguments, especially as
to the mechanisms by which Circular 230 will work.
48 Indeed, the "tax shelter" bar is distinguished from the regular tax bar; the
former is arguably subject to a stigma. See Hill, supra note 8, at 1066.
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Notwithstanding some commentators' beliefs that all tax planning
activities are undesirable and that there is no "right" to engage in tax
planning,49 many others believe in a principled distinction between tax
planning and tax shelter activity. Nobody knows exactly where such a
distinction might be and what might be the principle at issue - many
possible principles have been tried on for fit, with no consistent
success either in the courts or with commentators.50 Approaches that
discourage "too much" tax planning will therefore be infeasible, and
those that target "tax shelters" have been hindered by the difficulty of
drawing a principled distinction between tax shelters and tax planning.
Indeed, in this regard the recent proposal by Presidential
candidate Barack Obama to deny patents for "inventions designed to
minimize, avoid, defer, or otherwise affect liability for Federal, State,
local, or foreign tax"51 notwithstanding that patents are generally
available for business methods, including tax planning methods.
There has been considerable criticism of the proposal, on several
grounds. Given how much difficulty the courts and legislators have in
distinguishing between tax planning that is expressly allowed and tax
planning that is disfavored - that is, planning that constitutes a
"shelter" - it seems inconceivable that the patent office could readily
make such a distinction. Thus, the proposal seems more likely to
invite litigation than serve any other purpose."
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented an argument that governments, when
designing their tax policy, should be aware of two distinct types of
social costs: the cost associated with lost revenue and the cost that
arises from taxpayers' search for new methods to reduce their tax
burden. Inevitably, reducing one of these costs comes at the expense
of increasing the other; the government faces a tradeoff. By
recognizing these costs and the tradeoff the government faces, we can
better understand current tax policy. Moreover, a wider recognition of
49 Weisbach, supra note 1, at 220.
'0 Consider, in this regard, the flurry of litigation cited by Kristin E. Hickman,
Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX REV. 905 (2007). See generally
Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REV. 125 (2002).
51 See Levin, Coleman, Obama Introduce Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (Feb. 17,
2007), http://www.senate.gov/-levin/newsroom/release.cfm?id=269479.
52 See, e.g., Patent Reform: Tax Shelter Patents (Feb. 19, 2007), http://www.
patentlyo.comlpatent/2007/02/patent reformt.html (a discussion of the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act on the Patently-O Patent Law Blog).
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the tradeoff described above, and a systematic consideration of how to
disrupt markets in tax planning activities, should lead to better tax
policy.

